STPAThe off-site power warning for Ukraine's nuclear plants, rebuilt in TRACEIT as an STPA control structure, common cause and loss scenarios
01Summary
02A joint warning from three European regulator associations
The joint statement was issued in the names of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), the Heads of European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERCA) and the Heads of Nordic Radiation Safety Authorities (NORA). It says that attacks on electricity grids and substations have caused prolonged, widespread power outages, "thus undermining the conditions required to maintain nuclear safety." It adds that these conditions could deteriorate further, "potentially leading to a complete failure of the national electricity grid (so called "total black out") with further serious implications for the safety of all nuclear facilities," and that restoring the grid could be very difficult. Media reports described it as a warning from regulators of 38 countries, counting the members of the three associations.
Per Strand, head of HERCA and NORA, told Reuters that this winter carries the highest risk of a nuclear accident. The worst case he described is a national blackout affecting all nine operating reactors at the same time. The "nine reactors" remark comes from the interview, not from the statement itself.
According to the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) status page (updated November 9), nine reactors are operating in Ukraine: two at Khmelnytskyi, four at Rivne and three at South Ukraine, while all six units at Zaporizhzhia are in cold shutdown. The NEA notes that on November 7 all operating plants lost part of their grid connections and reduced output. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Zaporizhzhia lost all off-site power for more than 12 hours on November 8 when its last 330 kV line was cut, the 27th such loss since the conflict began. Four emergency diesel generators started automatically, and operation was later reduced to two to save fuel.
This article does not judge any party's responsibility. Wording about the attacks is quoted from the statement. Counts of power losses differ by source; we use the IAEA count. The model below is a simplified educational example based on public information. It does not assess the design or actual safety state of any specific plant.
03Why a shut-down reactor still needs power
After a reactor is shut down, its fuel keeps producing heat (decay heat) for some time. Removing it requires pumps, and pumps require AC power. Normally this comes from the grid outside the plant as off-site power; losing it is called a loss of off-site power (LOOP). The emergency diesel generators on site then start and power the safety systems. Losing both off-site power and emergency AC power is a station blackout (SBO).
The IAEA's seven indispensable pillars for nuclear safety during armed conflict, set out in 2022, reflect this structure. Pillar four states that "there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites," and pillar five that there must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains to and from the sites. Diesel fuel for the generators is part of that supply.
Sources unrelated to the war make the same point. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) analysis of loss-of-offsite-power events for 1997–2014, supported by the U.S. NRC, questions the practice of treating each plant's LOOP as an independent event. The 2003 blackout in North America affected nine plants at seven sites at once, and between 1997 and 2014 a single incident affected more than one plant on 12 occasions. Those 12 occasions accounted for 33 of the 87 events counted (38%).
04Drawing a control structure with two sites
STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis) treats an accident as a failure of control rather than a chain of component failures. The example puts a grid operator, two nuclear sites (A and B) and diesel fuel logistics into one control structure. Each site has an operator, an emergency diesel generator (EDG) and a decay heat removal system, and each receives off-site power from a different substation. The two substations and the fuel logistics, colored orange, are the shared resources this article examines.
| Element | Role | Signals |
|---|---|---|
| [E1] Grid operator (TSO) | Operates the grid and repairs damaged lines | Receives substation status; sends line repair/reconnection and output reduction requests to the plants |
| [E2]/[E3] Substations A, B | Supply off-site power to sites A and B | Send off-site power A/B to each site's decay heat removal system |
| [E4]/[E7] Site A, B operators | Direct cooling operation and power transfer | Receive decay heat removal status; send cooling operation/power transfer and EDG unit count adjustment |
| [E5]/[E8] EDGs A, B | Supply AC power when off-site power is lost | Generate emergency AC power from fuel stock |
| [E6]/[E9] Decay heat removal A, B | Remove decay heat from the shut-down reactor | Run on either off-site or emergency AC power and report status |
| [E10] Diesel fuel logistics | Supplies fuel to the EDGs of both sites | Sends diesel fuel to EDGs A and B |
The "available AC power" of the decay heat removal system is written in TRACEIT as PM6 = FB3 + FB8. The + means OR: cooling continues with either off-site power (FB3) or emergency AC power (FB8). This is the defense in depth of a nuclear plant's power design. Emergency AC power comes from fuel stock (PM4), and fuel stock comes from diesel fuel logistics (FB7).
Following one cooling status to its sources
Select site A's decay heat removal status (FB10) and turn on the trace, and TRACEIT highlights in yellow the elements used to generate it. There are two branches: off-site power from substation A and emergency AC power from EDG A. EDG A in turn depends on diesel fuel logistics, and so does site B's EDG.
05Turning off one shared resource
On the control structure diagram, sites A and B use different substations and different generators, so they look independent. TRACEIT's Abnormal Analysis lets you attach attributes to elements; when you turn off one attribute value, it assumes every element with that value loses its function at the same time and computes the effect. It is a way to simulate common cause failure (CCF) on the control structure.
In the example we created two attributes. The Power Grid attribute got the value "National grid (shared)," attached to substations A and B. The Fuel Supply attribute got the value "Diesel fuel logistics (shared)," attached to EDGs A and B. Then we selected all six control actions and ran the simulation.
The result shows two things. First, defense in depth works. Turning off the grid value affects substation B, but the result is Normal, and the cause column reads "PM7: FB9 used instead of FB5": emergency AC power is used instead of off-site power. Turning off the fuel value does the opposite, and the site holds on off-site power. Because available AC power is an OR expression, losing one side does not stop cooling.
Second, the transfer happens at both sites at the same time. Site A shows the same pattern. When one grid value is turned off, both sites move to their emergency diesel generators together, and from that moment the cooling of both sites depends on one value, Fuel Supply. What looked like two independent lines of defense becomes, after the grid is lost, a single shared dependency on fuel logistics. This is the statement's warning that a total black out would affect all nuclear facilities, expressed as a control structure.
06Summarizing with UCAs and loss scenarios
We set two losses. L1 is harm to people and the environment from a release of radioactive material, and L2 is interruption of power supply due to loss of nuclear generation. The hazards are decay heat not being removed (H1), several sites losing off-site power at once and relying only on EDGs (H2), and generator fuel running out before off-site power is restored (H3).
| UCA | Statement | Hazard |
|---|---|---|
| UCA6-N-1 | The grid operator must repair and reconnect the lines when the substations or lines serving a nuclear site are damaged, but cannot. | H2 |
| UCA6-T-2 | The grid operator must restore the lines before the EDG fuel runs out, but restores them late. | H3 |
| UCA2-P-1 | The site A operator must not reduce the number of running EDGs when there is no power margin for cooling, but does so to save fuel. | H1, H3 |
| UCA1-N-1 | The site A operator must run decay heat removal on emergency AC power after losing off-site power, but cannot. | H1 |
| UCA3-N-1 | The site B operator, losing off-site power at the same time, must run decay heat removal on emergency AC power, but cannot. | H1, H2 |
Loss scenarios explain why a UCA occurs.
- LS1 (UCA3-N-1) When the national grid collapses, sites A and B lose off-site power at the same time and decay heat removal at both sites relies on EDGs. The generators of both sites use the same fuel supply route. The causes are two common causes: the same transmission grid and a single fuel supply route.
- LS2 (UCA6-T-2) While repeated line damage and blocked repair access delay restoration, EDG fuel stocks fall. The grid operator does not know which site will run out first.
- LS3 (UCA2-P-1) With fuel deliveries cut off, the operator reduces the number of running EDGs to save fuel, and the power available for cooling falls.
- LS4 (UCA1-N-1) When site A's EDG stops for lack of fuel, there is no AC power for decay heat removal, and the site enters a station blackout (SBO).
LS3 reflects actual reports. When Zaporizhzhia halved the number of running generators in August to save fuel, the IAEA stated that no nuclear power plant should have to reduce the operation of essential cooling systems in order to conserve diesel fuel.
07Six countermeasures
Countermeasures are attached to each loss scenario. The first three have importance 1.
Keep at least two paths through different substations and transmission corridors. You can check this in the abnormal analysis by whether the two sites' off-site power shares an attribute value. (LS1)
Attach resources that several sites share, such as the grid and fuel supply, as element attributes, and analyze how many sites are affected when that value is turned off. (LS1)
Reset fuel reserves based on expected restoration time and secure at least two supply routes. (LS2, LS3, LS4)
Plants and the grid operator share each site's remaining fuel time in real time and set line repair priorities accordingly. (LS2)
Define in advance when the number of running generators may be reduced to save fuel, together with the cooling power margin. (LS3)
Prepare mobile generators and external connection points for a station blackout. (LS4)
The same question beyond nuclear plants
Several facilities relying on one supply is a structure found in data centers, hospitals, telecom sites and semiconductor fabs. Even if each facility has its own backup generator, a single fuel contract or a shared substation can put all of them into emergency mode at the same time. Draw the control structure, attach attributes such as grid, fuel and location to each element, and turn one value off. Hidden common causes show up early.
08Frequently asked questions
Q1Every nuclear plant has emergency diesel generators. Why is a grid blackout dangerous?
Emergency diesel generators are the last source of AC power after off-site power is lost. If the whole grid collapses, every site relies on that last line of defense at the same time, and the longer restoration takes, the more it matters whether the fuel supply can hold. If the generators at different sites depend on one fuel route, losing that route moves several sites toward station blackout together.
Q2How does STPA differ from probabilistic safety assessment (PSA)?
PSA combines the probabilities of equipment failures and events to calculate risk. STPA maps who controls what with which information, and looks for the conditions under which that control becomes unsafe. As in this example, it can cover organizational and operational factors such as the grid operator's repair decisions or an operator's choice to save fuel, so it complements PSA.
Q3What can TRACEIT's Abnormal Analysis check?
You attach attributes such as grid, fuel and location to each element and turn off one attribute value. TRACEIT then follows the signal flow and expressions of the control structure to compute which signals break and which control actions can no longer be performed. You can see directly on the control structure whether two systems you thought were independent share an attribute value.
The control structure, signals, UCAs, loss scenarios, causes and countermeasures in this example are simplified educational assumptions based on statements, reports and agency materials published through November 16. They do not assess the design or actual safety state of any specific plant, and do not judge the responsibility of any agency or country.
References
· WENRA, HERCA and NORA, "Joint statement on the potential impact on nuclear safety from Russia's attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure" (2026-11-16) — WENRA page
· OECD/NEA, "Ukraine: Current status of nuclear power installations" — NEA page
· IAEA, "Update 375 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine" (2026-11-14) — IAEA page
· Kyiv Independent, report on the regulators' joint warning and the Per Strand interview (2026-11-16) — Read
· INL/EXT-16-37873, "Analysis of Loss-of-Offsite-Power Events 1997–2014" (2016) — PDF
· Leveson & Thomas, "STPA Handbook" (MIT, 2018) — PDF
· MIT PSASS, "STAMP Tools" — Page

